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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
Defendant Conrado DeJesus Castano-Vasquez pled guilty 
to a one-count indictment charging him with knowingly and 
intentionally importing more than 100 grams of heroin in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. S 952(a). At sentencing, he moved for 
a downward departure under the newly enacted U.S.S.G. 
S 5K2.20, which permits a departure "in an extraordinary 
case" on the basis of the defendant's "aberrant behavior." 
The application notes to S 5K2.20 list three definitional 
characteristics of the behavior a defendant must meet 
before an aberrant behavior departure can even be 
considered and then lists five factors that a sentencing 
court may consider in determining if the case is 
extraordinary and a departure is warranted. The District 
Court determined that Castano-Vasquez met the three 
definitional characteristics but that his case was not 
extraordinary and, without referring to each of the five 
factors, denied the departure and sentenced him to a 46- 
month term of imprisonment. On appeal, Castano-Vasquez 
contends that, in denying the departure, the court misread 
the guideline by failing to consider each of the enumerated 
factors. 
 
We conclude that the most natural reading of S 5K2.20, 
in the context of the Guidelines as a whole, requires a 
sentencing court to address two separate and independent 
inquiries: whether the defendant's case is extraordinary and 
whether his or her conduct constituted aberrant behavior. 
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Further, in determining whether a particular case is 
extraordinary, we hold that a sentencing court may, but is 
not obligated to, consider the five factors delineated in 
Application Note 2 of S 5K2.20. Because the District Court 
here expressly considered two of the factors and certainly 
heard defense counsel's arguments as to all five, we 
conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion in 
denying the departure request in this case. We will 
therefore affirm the judgment. 
 
I. 
 
On February 6, 2000, Castano-Vasquez arrived at 
Newark International Airport on a flight from Bogota, 
Colombia. In the course of a routine customs inspection, 
agents searched a black piece of luggage, which Castano- 
Vasquez had claimed and had given consent to search. The 
search revealed a false bottom, and further searching 
revealed a white powdery substance that tested positive for 
heroin. Subsequent lab analysis indicated that the net 
weight of the heroin was 985.5 grams. 
 
On February 9, 2000, a grand jury in the District of New 
Jersey returned a one-count indictment, charging Castano- 
Vasquez with knowingly and intentionally importing more 
than 100 grams of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C.S 952(a). 
On June 30, 2000, Castano-Vasquez pled guilty to the 
indictment. At sentencing on November 13, 2000, the 
District Court entertained a defense motion brought under 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.20 for a downward departure on the ground 
that the criminal conduct constituted aberrant behavior. 
 
In support of the departure, defense counsel submitted 
21 letters from Castano-Vasquez' family, friends, co- 
workers, and acquaintances, all of whom attested to his 
good character. Counsel also proffered information about 
Castano-Vasquez' financial and medical conditions that had 
motivated him to commit the offense, the theft of the truck 
that he had used in his farming livelihood, and his 
subsequent loss of ability to provide for his family. Counsel 
further attested to Castano-Vasquez' age, education, and 
employment history, all of which were documented in the 
Presentence Investigation Report. Finally, counsel proffered 
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that Castano-Vasquez was a well liked member of his 
community who drove others to the polls so that they could 
vote in the elections. In sum, counsel vouched "that it's not 
every day that your Honor is going to see an individual of 
the character of Mr. Castano-Vasquez, notwithstanding the 
terrible error in judgment that he made when he decided to 
make this trip." 
 
Because S 5K2.20 had become effective barely two weeks 
before Castano-Vasquez' sentencing hearing, the District 
Court thoughtfully engaged both counsel in an extended 
discussion regarding how to interpret and apply it. The 
court ultimately concluded that the Commission sought to 
accomplish the following: 
 
       It's asking you to define whether you think this is an 
       extraordinary case. 
 
       How do you define whether it's an extraordinary 
       case? 
 
       Literally, whether it is outside of the ordinary. 
 
       And that's a determination separate and apart from 
       whether the three factors of aberrant behavior are met. 
       And that's so because of the way it's written. Because 
       the predicate to looking at whether the three factors of 
       aberrant behavior are met is, is it an extraordinary 
       case? 
 
       Once a determination is made that it's an 
       extraordinary case, then we look to whether the three 
       factors are met. 
 
The court then proceeded to analyze the facts pertaining to 
Castano-Vasquez. Initially, the court found that Castano- 
Vasquez had met the three definitional requirements for 
aberrant behavior. But then, it concluded: 
 
       Now, if we look at the economic factors that you've 
       pointed out, I can't say in my experience that it's 
       extraordinary. If we look at the fact that he's in his 
       fifties, as one of many thing to look at, I can't say that 
       that in and of itself makes it extraordinary. If we look 
       at the fact that he's a hard-working man with a family 
       and will do anything in the world for his family, as 
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       courier cases go, that doesn't seem to make it 
       extraordinary. And any of those factors in combination 
       I don't think makes it extraordinary. 
 
Defense counsel then interceded with more proffers 
concerning Castano-Vasquez' age, medical and financial 
problems, and community work. In the end, the District 
Court remained unconvinced. Using the analytical 
construct it had previously set forth, the court found that 
this case was not extraordinary: 
 
       I say unequivocally that Mr. Castano-Vasquez is an 
       extraordinary person and prior to this has led an 
       exemplary life as far as I can tell from the facts that are 
       before me, but I think to be true to my understanding 
       of what the sentencing guidelines intend here in 
       attempting to give the Court discretion in providing in 
       appropriate circumstances a downward departure, that 
       the kind of extraordinary case that they contemplate is 
       just not here. 
 
The court denied the downward departure motion and 
sentenced Castano-Vasquez to a 46-month term (the 
bottom of the guideline range), followed by four years of 
supervised release. 
 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
S 3742(a). We exercise plenary review over whether the 
District Court adopted the proper legal standard for 
interpreting and applying this guideline. United States v. 
Torres, 251 F.3d 138, 145 (3d Cir. 2001). However, "[w]e 
lack jurisdiction to review a refusal to depart downward 
when the district court, knowing it may do so, nonetheless 
determines that departure is not warranted." United States 
v. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 729 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
II. 
 
In relevant part, the text of S 5K2.20, which became 
effective on November 1, 2000, provides as follows: 
 
       A sentence below the applicable guideline range may be 
       warranted in an extraordinary case if the defendant's 
       criminal conduct constituted aberrant behavior. . . . 
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Commentary 
 
       Application Notes: 
 
       1. For purposes of this policy statement -- 
 
       "Aberrant behavior" means a single criminal 
       occurrence or single criminal transaction that (A) 
       was committed without significant planning; (B) 
       was of limited duration; and (C) represents a 
       marked deviation by the defendant from an 
       otherwise law-abiding life. . . . 
 
       2. In determining whether the court should depart on 
       the basis of aberrant behavior, the court may 
       consider the defendant's (A) mental and emotional 
       conditions; (B) employment record; (C) record of 
       prior good works; (D) motivation for committing the 
       offense; and (E) efforts to mitigate the effects of the 
       offense. 
 
On appeal, Castano-Vasquez contends that the District 
Court erred by ignoring the five factors in Application Note 
2 in assessing the applicability of the aberrant behavior 
departure. Specifically, he claims that the court did not 
look at those factors to determine whether his case was 
"extraordinary," but rather, misunderstood the defense 
argument to be that, because he met the criteria for 
"aberrant behavior," he necessarily also qualified for the 
departure. Moreover, he argues that the court considered 
only his financial motivation for committing the offense in 
finding that the case was not extraordinary. 
 
As a policy statement, S 5K2.20 is an authoritative guide 
for sentencing courts as to the meaning of the departure 
guidelines generally found in Chapter Five, Part K of the 
Guidelines. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42 
(1993); United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 862-63 (3d 
Cir. 1997) ("As we proceed, we bear in mind that not only 
is each guideline legally binding on the courts, but so too 
are the accompanying policy statements, and commentary, 
so long as neither the policy statements nor the 
commentary is inconsistent with any guideline.") (citations 
omitted).1 Under S 5K2.20, a sentencing court may depart 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In passing, we note that, at one point during the sentencing hearing, 
the District Court stated that S 5K2.20 "is a policy statement, I'm not 
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downwards from the applicable guideline range "in an 
extraordinary case if the defendant's criminal conduct 
constituted aberrant behavior."2 In proposing this new 
guideline, the Commission explained that it was responding 
to a split in the circuits regarding "whether, for purposes of 
downward departures from the guideline range, a`single act 
of aberrant behavior' . . . includes multiple acts occurring 
over a period of time." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, 
supp. app. C, amend. 603, at 78 (2000) (addressing 
Chapter One, Part A, Subpart 4(d) and citing, among other 
cases, United States v. Marcello, 13 F.3d 752, 760-61 (3d 
Cir. 1994), in which we held that a single act of aberrant 
behavior requires a spontaneous, thoughtless, single act 
involving lack of planning). The Commission, however, 
adopted neither the majority nor the minority circuit view 
on this issue. See id. 
 
Instead, as a threshold matter, the Commission restricted 
the availability of a departure only to extraordinary cases. 
See id. The Commission did not expound on the meaning of 
"extraordinary," and in such a circumstance, we give that 
term its ordinary meaning. See Chapman v. United States, 
500 U.S. 453, 461-62 (1991) (ordinary meaning applies in 
the absence of a statutory definition or established common 
law meaning). The ordinary meaning of "extraordinary" is 
"more than ordinary . . . going beyond what is usual, 
regular, common, or customary . . . exceptional to a very 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
bound by it." However, while Castano-Vasquez quotes this language in 
his brief, he does not rely on it to argue that the court failed to follow 
the 
policy statement. Indeed, our review of the entire transcript does not 
reflect that the court in any way disregarded the guideline. 
 
2. In the text of S 5K2.20, the Commission also identified five exceptions 
that would render a downward departure on this basis impermissible, 
but none of them apply here. These exceptions are: (1) the offense 
involved serious bodily injury or death; (2) the defendant discharged a 
firearm or otherwise used a firearm or a dangerous weapon; (3) the 
instant offense of conviction is a serious drug trafficking offense; (4) 
the 
defendant has more than one criminal history point, as calculated under 
Chapter Four of the Guidelines; and (5) the defendant has a prior 
federal, or state, felony conviction, regardless of whether the conviction 
is countable under Chapter Four. 
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marked extent." Webster's New Int'l Dictionary 807 (3d ed. 
1993). We leave the determination of whether a defendant 
presents an extraordinary case to the sound discretion of 
the sentencing court. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual S 5K2.0 (2000) ("The decision as to whether and to 
what extent departure is warranted rests with the 
sentencing court on a case-specific basis."); see also Koon 
v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996). 
 
The Commission then defined "aberrant behavior" in 
Application Note 1 to mean "a single criminal occurrence or 
single criminal transaction that (A) was committed without 
significant planning; (B) was of limited duration; and (C) 
represents a marked deviation by the defendant from an 
otherwise law-abiding life." The Commission explained that 
its definition was more flexible than the interpretations 
given by most of the circuits and attempted to provide 
guidance and limitations regarding what could be 
considered such behavior. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual, supp. app. C, amend. 603, at 78-79 (2000). At the 
same time, it declined to adopt a "totality of the 
circumstances" approach and believed that the guideline 
would not broadly expand departures for aberrant behavior. 
See id. at 79. 
 
Specifically, the Commission stated that, "[f]or offense 
conduct to be considered for departure as aberrant 
behavior, the offense conduct must, at a minimum have" 
the three characteristics concerning planning, duration, 
and deviation found in the text of the guideline. Id. 
Moreover, the Commission stated that S 5K2.20"places 
significant restrictions on the type of offense and the 
criminal history of the offender that can be considered for 
this departure." Id. It further explained that these 
restrictions "reflect a Commission concern that certain 
offense conduct is so serious that a departure premised on 
a finding of aberrant behavior should not be available to 
those offenders who engage in such conduct." Id. Along 
similar lines, the Commission stated that "the restrictions 
on criminal history reflect a Commission view that 
defendants with significant prior criminal records should 
not qualify for a departure premised on the aberrant nature 
of their current conduct." Id. Finally, the Commission 
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recognized that "a number of other factors may have some 
relevance in evaluating the appropriateness of a departure 
based on aberrant behavior." Id. It listed "[s]ome of the 
relevant factors identified in the case law and public 
comment . . . in an application note," apparently referring 
to Application Note 2, which contains the five factors at 
issue in this appeal. Id. 
 
In developing an analytical construct for applying this 
guideline, the District Court characterized the inquiry of 
whether a case was "extraordinary" as a predicate to 
determining whether the three factors for aberrant behavior 
in Application Note 1 are met. Castano-Vasquez does not 
challenge this order of analysis in the court's construct. 
Rather, he contests the degree to which the sentencing 
court should consider the five factors in Application Note 2 
before making its determination as to whether a particular 
case is extraordinary.3 
 
Castano-Vasquez' claim fails because the premise of his 
argument -- that the court looked solely to his financial 
motivation for committing the offense in finding that the 
case was not extraordinary -- is factually inaccurate. In 
determining that Castano-Vasquez did not present an 
extraordinary case, the court expressly relied on his age, 
financial condition, and employment history. From the 
transcript, we may confidently infer that the court 
considered at least two of the five factors in Application 
Note 2 (employment record and motivation for committing 
the offense) and assuredly heard defense counsel's proffer 
as to all five. And, in any case, as the Government points 
out, while a district court is statutorily obligated to "state in 
open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular 
sentence," 18 U.S.C. S 3553(c), it is not similarly obligated 
to explain its refusal to depart downwards, United States v. 
Georgiadis, 933 F.2d 1219, 1222-23 (3d Cir. 1991). Thus, 
even if the District Court were required to consider all of 
the factors in Application Note 2, the court would not then 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We note that, despite its comments on the order of consideration, the 
District Court did, in fact, first find that Castano-Vasquez had met the 
three definitional factors in Application Note 1, and then it determined 
that this case was not an extraordinary one. 
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be required to state expressly that it had done so in 
denying Castano-Vasquez' request for a departure. 
Notwithstanding this factual inaccuracy, Castano- 
Vasquez' contention fails as a matter of law. The precise 
legal question presented by this appeal is whether the 
District Court was obligated to consider the five factors in 
Application Note 2 in determining whether Castano- 
Vasquez' case was extraordinary. The term "extraordinary" 
and the phrase "if the defendant's criminal conduct 
constituted aberrant behavior" appear in the same opening 
sentence of the text of S 5K2.20. The guideline further 
expressly lists three requirements that the defendant must 
satisfy in order for the court to make a finding that the 
criminal conduct constituted aberrant behavior -- a reading 
that is supported by the Commission's own proposal. While 
the guideline is silent as to what factors make a case 
extraordinary, the Commission stated in its proposal that it 
intended to restrict the availability of a departure only to 
such cases. All of these facts suggest that a sentencing 
court is obligated to make two separate determinations: (1) 
whether the defendant's case is extraordinary, and (2) 
whether his or her criminal conduct constituted aberrant 
behavior. If the defendant cannot satisfy either of these two 
inquiries, then, of course, no departure would be 
warranted. Unlike what transpired here, however, there is 
no need to interpret the guideline as requiring a specific 
order to that analysis -- that is, a finding that the case is 
extraordinary before a finding on whether the defendant's 
conduct constitutes aberrant behavior. The guideline does 
not bind the sentencing court to a particular order of 
analysis. As the District Court itself recognized, these 
separate and independent inquiries both must be satisfied 
before granting a departure. 
 
Assuming, as in the case of Castano-Vasquez, that the 
defendant can meet the requirements for aberrant behavior, 
that leaves open the question of how the sentencing court 
is to determine whether the particular case is extraordinary 
such that a departure is warranted. In proposing the 
guideline, the Commission recognized that "a number of 
other factors may have some relevance in evaluating the 
appropriateness of a departure" and provided a list of 
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"[s]ome of the relevant factors identified in the case law and 
public comment" in Application Note 2 for the court's 
consideration. Nothing in the application note either 
obligates the court to consider these factors or intimates 
that the list is exhaustive, thereby restricting the court's 
discretion.4 Rather, the factors serve merely as helpful 
guideposts for the court in determining whether it should 
depart under S 5K2.20. These observations suggest that the 
factors in Application Note 2 provide criteria that a 
sentencing court may, but is not bound to, consider when 
assessing whether a case is extraordinary. 
 
Accordingly, after reviewing the text and supporting 
materials, we conclude that the most natural reading of 
S 5K2.20, in the context of the Guidelines as a whole, 
supports an analytical construct in which the sentencing 
court must conduct two separate and independent 
inquiries, both of which the defendant must satisfy before 
a departure can be granted. That is, the court must 
determine whether the defendant's case is extraordinary 
and whether his or her conduct constituted aberrant 
behavior. Further, in determining whether a particular case 
is extraordinary, we hold that a sentencing court may, but 
is not obligated to, consider the five factors delineated in 
Application Note 2 of S 5K2.20. 
 
Due to the guideline's recent vintage, we are unable to 
find many courts that have issued opinions regarding 
requests for downward departures on the ground of 
aberrant behavior. But at least one district court appears to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Cf. United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2000) (under 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), "this Court may vacate and remand [defendant's] 
sentence . . . but is not required to do so") (internal quotations and 
citations omitted), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1157 (2001); United States v. 
Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 370 (3d Cir. 1999) ("What[defendant] overlooks in 
making this argument is that the relevant provision merely suggests that 
the court `may' ameliorate or suspend the condition where there is low 
risk of future substance abuse. It does not state that the court is 
required to do so."), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1023 (2000); but cf. United 
States v. Torres, 251 F.3d 138, 147 (3d Cir. 2001) ("we hold that when 
considering a departure for substantial assistance, a sentencing court 
not only must conduct a qualitative, case-by-case analysis but also must 
examine S 5K1.1's five enumerated factors"). 
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concur with the above discussion. In United States v. Kelly, 
a district court addressed a defendant's request for a 
S 5K2.20 departure, outlining the order of analysis as 
follows: "A departure for aberrant behavior is warranted 
only where the offense conduct [meets the three 
requirements in Application Note 1]. If each of these factors 
is met, courts may consider the [five] factors[found in 
Application Note 2] in determining whether to grant a 
downward departure under this provision." No. 99 CR 422 
RWS, 2001 WL 395184, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2001). 
While Kelly could be read to imply a specific order of 
analysis, the end result is the same. The two inquiries -- 
whether the defendant's case is extraordinary and whether 
his or her conduct constituted aberrant behavior-- are 
independent, and thus, the defendant must satisfy them 
both, irrespective of the order in which the court chooses to 
address them. Indeed, we are aware of only two courts that 
have issued written decisions on S 5K2.20 departure 
motions, and both have denied them on the basis that the 
respective defendants had each failed to satisfy one or more 
of the three definitional requirements for aberrant behavior. 
See id.; United States v. Bailey, No. 1:00CR00044, 2001 WL 
459098, at *2 (W.D. Va. May 2, 2001). 
 
In sum, Castano-Vasquez' contention here -- that the 
District Court failed to consider all of the five factors in 
Application Note 2 in denying the departure motion-- is 
factually inaccurate. Moreover, the court was not obligated 
to consider each and every factor because the Commission 
promulgated a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors, 
instructing sentencing courts that they may, but are not 
obligated to, consider them in determining whether to 
depart. Therefore, we conclude that the District Court 
properly exercised its discretion in denying Castano- 
Vasquez' departure request. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court's judgment. 
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